Book I, Section 6
But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we
have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists
have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are
pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a
single Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these
somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to
these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of
in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason
of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things
useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to
a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is
it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as
intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if
we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would
place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than
the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty.
But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the
account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them
all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But
of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the
accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some
common element answering to one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things
that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being
derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they
rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason
in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had
better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them
would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And
similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which
is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and
independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by
man; but we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however,
some one might think it worth while to recognize this with a view to
the goods that are attainable and achievable; for having this as a sort
of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if
we know them shall attain them. This argument has some plausibility,
but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of
these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency
of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the
exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek,
so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver
or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing
this 'good itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will
be a better doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to
study health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the
health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But
enough of these topics.
Book I, Section 7
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be.
It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in
medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the
good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In
medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house,
in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the
end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they
do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the
good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will
be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but
we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently
more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes,
and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not
all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something
final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we
are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these
will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy
of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake
of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of
something else more final than the things that are desirable both in
themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call
final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself
and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose
each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for
anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to
follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by
self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by
himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents,
children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens,
since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this;
for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and
friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this
question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now
define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in
nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it
most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing
among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is
added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and
self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This
might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of
man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in
general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and
the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be
for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner
certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a
function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts
evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a
function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be
common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let
us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there
would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to
the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active
life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part
has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other
in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of
the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in
the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more
proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of
soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say
'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification
in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name
of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre,
and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case,
and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this
to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle,
and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of
these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in
accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human
good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if
there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most
complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first
sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would
seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has
once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner
in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for
any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has
been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but
in each class of things such precision as accords with the
subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a
carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways;
the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work,
while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for
he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in
all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated
to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike;
it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the
case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first
principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by
perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other
ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the
natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since
they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is
thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we
ask are cleared up by it.
Book I, Section 7
We
must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a
true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon
clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are
described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call
those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical
actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our
account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old
one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we
identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls
among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief
which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and
does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good
life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in
happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined
happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with
practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with
these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without
pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of
these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few
eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be
entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least
some one respect or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our
account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it
makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in
possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of
mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is
asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot;
for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting
well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the
strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of
these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the
noble and good things in life.
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